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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
RIGHTS OF AN ADVERSE POSSESSOR
By W. E. Bu1By*
In 1740 Willes, Lord Chief Justice, in rendering his deci-
sion in the case of Lambert v. Stroother' made the following
observation: "Upon this head a great many cases were
cited, on which my brother Draper said appeared to him
at first to be so very intricate and inconsistent that he was
a great while before he could find out the meaning of them,
or reconcile them one with another, but that at last with
great difficulty he had found out a distinction which recon-
ciled them all. And I must own that I do not understand
them yet, and am not able to reconcile them and, therefore
I shall lay most of them aside, because I think I can deter-
mine this point with the assistance of but very of them."
Without the ability of Serit. Draper to reconcile all the
cases, and without the assurance of the Lord Chief Justice
of being able to determine this question with the assistance
of very few of them, the writer undertakes this discussion
of the rights of an adverse possessor.
For the purposes of this article an adverse possessor will
be defined as one in the possession of real property claim-
ing title thereto, the possession and claim of right being of
such nature that if continued for the required length of
time will be a bar to the assertion of title by the real owner.
The scope of the article will be limited to a discussion of
the rights of an adverse possessor as against third persons,
strangers to the title.
The disseisor of history is the adverse possessor of
today.2 He was at one time regarded as the owner in fee
and had all the rights pertaining to ownership.3  The dis-
possessed owner would seem to have lost all property
rights until re-entry.4  This man of history does not lack
* Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.
1 Lambert v. Stroother, Wiles 219 at 221, 125 E. R. 1140 (1740).
See Property in Chattels, 29 HAv. L. Rav. at p. 878.
' James Barr Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels, 8 HARv. L. Ray. 28 (1869) ; AMES
LCruaEs ON LEaAL HisTORy, at p. 229; Joe. Bingham, Legal Posseasion, 18 Miuc. L.
RBv. at p. 561 (1915).
Liford's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 516. 77 E. R. 1216 (1615) ; Pacific Live Stock Co. v.
Isaacs, 52 Ore. 54, 96 Pac. 460 (1908).
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for modern defenders who, it would seem, out of respect
for his old age, still attribute to him the rights of owner-
ship.5 The modern tendency, however, is to connect seisin
with title and to give to the person disseised larger powers
to assert his title." It is generally stated that the rights
of the adverse possessor as against third persons have
remained unchanged.7 What, then, are the rights of the
adverse possessor against third persons?
The adverse possessor, like any other possessor of prop-
erty, has certain rights against third persons which are
based upon possession alone. It is believed that the
recognition of these possessory rights gave birth to the
confusing and inaccurate expression that one in the posses-
sion of property has title good against the whole world
except the true owner.8 It may be that there was a time
in legal history when the two words, seisin and possession,
were equivalent.9 In early English property law, posses-
sion was always of controlling importance. Title, as dis-
tinguished from possession, was of little consequence. It
is generally recognized to-day, however, that title is of
prime importance, and that there is a fundamental distinc-
tion between possession, adverse possession, and title.10 It
was determined as early as 1646 that a mere occupant of
property could maintain trespass quare causum fregit
against a stranger to the title."1 In the early cases the
courts, while apparently satisfied with the rule of damages
that in actions for injuries to real property the, measure of
damages should be determined by the extent of the plain-
tiff's interest, took the view that trespass quare clausum
fregit was a personal action, and since the title was not nec-
essarily involved, if the plaintiff was in possession and claim-
ed title, his claim could not be disputed by the defendant
unless he was claiming under a superior right. As stated by
* See Legal Possession, supra; H. W. Ballautine. Title by Adverse Possession, 82
lV. L. ItEv. 141 (1918).
SHoLDswowrn's HiT soy or ENousn LAW, Vol. 7. p. 81.
HowDswoan, aupra, p. 28, 46; 20 HARv. L. REv. 563; 23 LAw QUAR. Rzv. 130; 27
HBMv. L. Ra. 496.
8 See H. W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession. 32 HARV. L. REV. at 144
(1918). "There is an important limitation on the rule that bare possession is title
good against all the world except the true owner." It is difficult to see how there
can be a "limitation" on a rule that does not exist.
9 F. W. Maitland, The Mystery of Selsin, 2 LAW QuAR. Rzv. 481 (1886).
" See P. Bordwell, Disselsin and Adverse Possession, 83 YALE L. J. at 300 (1924).
n Johnson v. Barrett, Aleyn 10, 82 E. t. 887 (1646); Graham v. Peat, 1 East
244 (1801); See. Harper v. Charlesworth, 4 B. & C. 675 (1825); Cutts v. Spring, 15
Mass. 135 (1818); Oklahoma City v. Hill, 6 Okla. 114, 50 Pac. 242 (1897). As to
sufficiency of possession see, Catteris v. Cowper, 4 Taunt. 547 (1812).
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Willes, Lord Chief Justice, in Lambert v. Stroother,12
"Whereas trespass is a possessory action, founded merely on
the possession, and it is not at all necessary that the right
should come in question." The same thought is expressed
by Mr. Joseph Beale,13 "Trespass is not now and never was
* * * * * an action for injury to a right. * * * * Trespass is
and always has been an action for injury to the thing, and
whoever had the thing could recover for the whole injury,
although he might be answerable over." In Johnson v.
Barret14 a mere occupant was allowed full recovery for
injuries permanent in their nature. In Harper v. Charles-
worth 5 a mere possessor was allowed full recovery for
permanent injuries to the property. A modern statement
of the rule is: "If therefore the occupant of the land claims
title, this claim cannot be disputed by a trespasser, who
must therefore pay to the occupant the entire damages
where no one has disputed his claim or interfered with his
possession."'1  There can be little justification for a rule
of damages which permits a party to enhance the amount
of his recovery by setting up a claim that may or may not
be true and which it is not in the power of the defendant
to dispute. It has, however, the merit of being consistent
with the principle that gave it birth; i.e., when one brings
an action of trespass quare clausum fregit he does so on the
basis of possession, and not on the theory of ownership. In
North v. Cates,17 full recovery was allowed for permanent
injuries. It did not appear that the plaintiff was more
than a mere occupant of the property. The court stated:
"From these authorities it seems evident that in actions of
trespass, it is not necessary for the plaintiff in his declara-
1 Supra, n. 1.
23 Cyc. Trespass, 1184n. See DIcEY ON PARTIES To ACTIONS (Truman's Notes).
Rule 79, Sub. Rule 1 (835), " * .* * for it is an established maxim that 'trespass is
a possessory action, founded merely on the possession, and it is not necessary that tho
right should come in question'."
11 Aleyn 10 (1646).
In 4 B. & C. 575 (1825Y. In many of the early cases where recovery is allowcd
the nature of the injury is not discussed. See Brest v. Lever, '7 b. 8; W. 593 (1841)
Cary v. Holt, 2 Strange 1287 (1746).
18 SEnowick ON DAmAGTs (9th ed.) Vol. 1 §69 (1918) See also, 4 SIITHERLAND ON
DAMxAnS (Ord ed.) §1012 (1908). The author would seem to limit the operation of
the rule to an adverse possessor, for it is stated that the defendant should pot ho
permitted to dispute the prima facie case for full recovery if the plalntiff was in
possession under color of title. A similar statement of the rule Is found in DIcly ON
PARTiES To AcrzoNs (Truman's NotesY (1882), Rule 79, Sub. Rule 1. The rulo as
there stated, however, denies the right of the defendant to set up the rights of a third
person in order to rebut the mere possesson right of the plaintiff. See EsTina
PLEADING (4th ed.) Vol. 2, p. 58, §2206 (1898); Pacific Ry. Co. v. Walker, 12 Han.
460 (1874).
If 2 Blbb 591 (Ky. 1812) ; accord, Owings v. Gibson, 2 A. K. Marsh 51g (Ky, 1820);
Hall V. Deaton, 68 S. W. 672 (Ky. 1902).
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tion to allege title, nor in such cases would it be sufficient
for the defendant to traverse the title of the plaintiff, but
he should show either a title in himself, or some other
under whose authority he entered." In the case of Todd
v. Jackson,' another action for permanent injuries, the
plaintiff failed in his attempt to prove title. The court
stated: "There is nothing in the idea that the plaintiffs are
prejudiced by the fact of having attempted to prove their
title and failed. If the title is immaterial, their failure to
prove it is immaterial." In the much cited case of Illinois
Coal Co. v. Cobb,19 the right to recover for permanent
injuries based upon prior possession was recognized by the
court. In Beaumont Lumber Co. v. Ballard, it was ex-
pressly found that the plaintiff did not occupy the prem-
ises under the proper claim of title to be considered as an
adverse possessor, yet full recovery for permanent injuries
was allowed. The same might be said of Woods v. Banks,21
where it was found that the plaintiff was an adverse pos-
sessor only at the election of the owner. It is not surpris-
ing that these cases are generally found in the list as auth-
orities supporting the statement that one in the possession
of property is the owner as against strangers to the title.
Such a statement ignores the fact that recovery is allowed,
not on the theory of ownership, but on the theory of posses-
sion. These and other cases allowing full recovery to the
one in possession, especially if he is not an adverse posses-
sor, would seem to be contrary to the generally recognized
rule of damages that in an action for injuries to real prop-
erty the amount of recovery should be measured by the
18 2 Dutch 525 (N. T. 1857).
10 94 I. 65 (1879) ; pontra, Sweeney v. Connaughton, 100 II. App. 79 (1901) ; La
Salle Coal Co. v. Sanitary District, 260 Ill. 423 (1913); holding that even an adverse
possessor should not be permitted full recovery for permanent injuries to the freehold.
^0 23 S. W. 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
21 14 N. H. 101 (1843). In the following cases it may be assumed that the plain.
tiff was in adverse possession, yet full recovery was allowed on the theory that prior
possession alone was sufficient. Cutts v. Spring, 15 Mass. 135 (1818); Reed v. Price,
30 Mo. 442 (1860). "The question of title was not necessarily in issue; for possession
was sufficient to maintain the action." Niekerson v. Thacher, 146 Mass. 609 (1888);
Pacific Ry. Co. v. Walker, 12 Ken. 460 (1874); Paraffine Oil Co. v. Berry, 93 S. W.
1098 (Tex. 1906); Carter v. Maryland & P. R. Co., 77 -Atl. 301 (Md. 1910); Truitt v.
Osler, 4 Boyce 555, 90 Atl. 467 (Del. 1914).
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extent of the plaintiff's interest.2 2  It is true that by show-
ing prior possession the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case for full recovery. Possession is presumptive evidence
of ownership.23 After showing such possession, the sec-
ondary burden of going forward with the evidence would
be on the defendant, but the primary burden of showing
title should still be on the plaintiff. In Burlington & Missouri
River Ry. Co. v. Beebe,24 Cobb, J. stated that after showing
possession, the burden was on the defendant "to prove title
out of the plaintiff." Cases so holding have the merit of dis-
puting the old theory that trespass quare clausum fregit is a
purely possessory action and that in no case is the question
of title involved if the fact of possession is established, un-
less the defendant is claiming under a superior title; yet
they seem contrary to the rules of evidence concerning the
burden of proof. Such cases in effect recognize that if
one seeks to recover for permanent injuries, he should
have more than a possessory interest, but place the burden
on the defendant of showing the limitations of the plain-
tiff's interest.
That the adverse possessor occupies a different position
than a mere possessor seems to have been recognized in
Owings v. Gibson25 where full recovery was allowed to the
adverse possessor on the ground that he was the owner as
against the whole world except the real owner. Such a
distinction was also made in Nelson v. Mather.26  It seems
2SEDGWICK ON DAMAGES (9th ed.) Vol. 1 §69 (1918) ; SUTHERILAND ON DAMAGES,
(3rd ed.) Vol. 4, §1097 (1908) ; It is not within the scope of this article to discuss
the merits or demerits of this rule of damages. That It differs from the rule as
applied in the case of personal property, where full recovery is allowed by the posses-
sor, is generally recognized. The Winkfleld, 18 T. L. R. 178 (Eng. C. A.). See an
interesting discussion of this rule as applied to personal property In Title to Chattels
by Possession, 7 LAw QUAD. REV. 224 (1891). In Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phillips,
1904 A. C. 405, 410, full recovery for timber cut on the land was allowed to the one
in possession as lessee apparently on the theory that, after being cut the timber became
personal property and was lawfully in the possession of the plaintiff. On the theory
of the Winkfield case supra, therefore,, a full recovery by the plaintiff as bailee of
personal property was proper.
See Ricbbourg v. Rose, 58 Fla. 178, 44 So. 69 (1907) in which an action of
replevin was brought for property severed from the freehold. In order to maintain
the action it was held that the plaintiff would have to be in actual or constructive
possession of the land at the time the property was severed. As the title to real
property cannot be directly tried in an action of replevin if the defendant was in
adverse possession replevin cannot be maintained.
" ESTEE'S PLEADING (4th ed.) Vol. 2 p. 57, §2204 (1898) ; WIozf0R ON EVIDENCE
Vol. 5 (2nd ed.) §2515; DicEY ON PARTIES To ACTIONS (Truman's Notes)
Rule 79, Sub. Rule 1 (1882); See International Railway Co. v. Ragsdale, 67 Tex. 24,
28, 2 S. W. 515 (1886).
24 14 Neb. 463 (1883) ; See also Reed v. Price, 80 Mo. 442 (1860) ; Lehigh & H. R.
Ry. Co. v. Antalies, 81 N. J. L. 685, 80 Ati. 469 (1911); Danielson v. Kullonen, 111
Minn. 471, 126 N. W. 404 (1910).
2 2 A. K. Marsh 515 (Ky. 1820).
" 5 Kan. 89 (1869).
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that the weight of authority in the United States is against
allowing either a possessor or an adverse possessor full
recovery for injuries to the freehold. For such recovery
the plaintiff must show either a satisfactory paper title or
title acquired by adverse possession.27 Such decisions, if
not inconsistent with the theory that an adverse possessor
has good title against the whole world except one who can
show a better title, present a very strong argument against
1t.28 If to be regarded as an owner, it is difficult to see
why the adverse possessor should be deprived of one of the
principal incidents of ownership; i.e., the right to protect
his property as against strangers to the title. That the
wrong-doer might not be discharged from liability as to
the original owner seems at most but a weak argument for
denying relief.
What has been said regarding trespass quare clusum
fregit would seem to be equally true of ejectment. Gen-
erally, for the purpose of ejectment, no distinction is made
between the mere possessor and the adverse possessor.
Both are allowed to recover in ejectment against a stranger
to the title, not on the theory that they are the owners of
the property, but on the theory that ejectment is a posses-
sory action and a prior peaceable possession is sufficient
to support it. Ejectment was not a real action at common
law.29 In its origin the remedy was only to recover posses-
sion acording to some temporary right, and it was only by
the use of fictions that the title was at length brought into
controversy.30 It is true that in ejectment the plaintiff
must recover on the strength of his owii "title" and not on
the weakness of the defendant's title; but, as stated by
Mr. Justice Curtis in Christy v. Scott et al,31 "* * * if the
plaintiff had actual prior possession of the land, this is
' Winchester v. City of Stevens Point, 58 Wis. 350, 17 N. W. 3 and 547 (1883) ;
Anderson v. Thunder Bay River Boom Co., 59 Mich. 216, 23 N. W. 776 (1885) ; Inter-
national By. Co. v. Ragdale, 67 Tex. 24, 28, 2 S. W. 515 (1886); Waltemeyer v. The
Wisconsin, Iowa & Neb. By. Co., 71 Iowa 626 (1887) ; Kelly v. N. Y. By. Co., 81 N. Y.
233 (1880) ; Frisbee v. Marshall, 122 N. C. 760, 765, 30 S. E. 21 (1898); La Salle
County Coal Co. v. Sanitary District, 260 Ill. 423, 103 N. E. 175 (1913).
2 See, Jos. Gingham, Legal Possession, 13 MICH. L. REv. 561 n. (1915). Where
It is stated that cases refusing full recovery to the adverse possessor are not incon-
sistent with the theory that he is the owner as against the whole world except the
one having a better title, because the granting of relief might result in double liability
to the trespasser in that the recovery by the adverse possessor might not bar an action
brought by the owner after reentry.
22 See Allen v. Rivington, 2 Saund. 111 (1846) ; Kortright v. Cady, 21 19. Y. 343,
862, (1860) ; 8 BLACKSTONE 199, 200.
an Southmayd v. Henley, 45 Cal. 101 (1872). sustained ejectment on prior possessionalone.
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strong enough to enable him to recover it from a mere tres-
passer, who entered without any right."
That there is a fundamental distinction between posses-
sion and adverse possession is made apparent from an
examination of the cases involving eminent domain pro-
ceedings. In order to recover for more than injuries to
his possessory interest, the plaintiff must prove his title.
That one in the adverse possession of property is entitled
to full compensation as against all persons except the real
owner seems to have been the conclusion reached by the
court in the leading case of Perry v. Clissold.82  In that
case, before the rights of the owner were barred by the
statute, land was taken from the adverse possessor under
eminent domain proceedings. The English Privy Council
directed a valuation of the land to be made apparently
with the view of awarding to the executors of the adverse
possessor damages for the full value of the land as of the
time of the resumption of the land by the crown. Appar-
ently, at the time of the order, the rights of the original
owner were barred. The decision of the court was based
on the theory that the adverse possessor is the owner as
against all strangers to the title. The decision can hardly
be said to represent the weight of authority in the United
States.33 Statements are found to the effect that denial of
full recovery to the adverse possessor in eminent domain
proceedings is not inconsistent with the theory that he is
the owner as against third persons for "the eminent domain
appropriator desires and is justified in demanding not
merely the vested rights, etc., of use, but also good title
and legal power to retain them against all the world in
return for full value paid" 34 It would seem that in pro-
ceedings of this kind the amount of compensation should
be determined not so much on what the eminent domain
If, however, a plaintiff in ejectment Is permitted to recover for injuries to the
freehold and is not limited to the rents and profits merely, then as for the right to
recover for permanent injuries the same principles should govern as are applied in
the case of trespass quare claeusuo fregit.
5 56 U. S. at 292 (1852).
" 1907 A. C. 73; See 20 HARe. L. REV. 563; Ceontre ex parto, Hollingsworth, 24
L. T. 347, 19 W. R. 580 (1871), held that by the resumption the adverse possessor's
inchoate title to the land was interrupted by the parliamentary rights of the company.
3 Robbins v. Milwaukee & Horicon It. R. Co., 6 Wis. 610 (1858); Costello V.
Burke, 63 Iowa 361 (1884) ; Waltemeyer v. Wisconsin, Iowa, and Neb. By. Co., 71
Iowa 626, 33 N. W. 140 (1887); See Campbell v. City of New Haven, 101 Conn. 170,
125 AtL 650, 23 MIcH L. REV. 180 (1924) ; Chandler v. Jamaica Pond and Aqueduct Co.,
125 Mass. 544 (1878), holder of base, qualified or determinable fee held to have
sufficient interest for full recovery.
" Jos. Bingham, Legal Possession, 13 MIcH. L. REv. 561 n. (1916).
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appropriator desires, but rather on what he actually takes
from the possessor. When deprived of his possession by
eminent domain proceedings, the adverse possessor is de-
prived not only of his possession, but also of a right which
he has as against third persons of remaining in possession
and if possible acquiring title. If he is in a position to
show, as he was in Perry v. Clissold, that he would have
acquired title if the property had not been taken from his
possession, he should receive compensation for any inter-
ference with this right. In the above assumed case the
measure of damages would be the full value of the prop-
erty. It should be awarded to him, not on the theory that
he is the owner of the property as against third persons,
but on the theory that he has a right to remain in posses-
sion and, if possible, acquire title. If that right is inter-
fered with by third persons, and he is in a position to show
that as a result of this act he has been deprived of acquiring
title, he should receive compensation. The situation is
similar to that presented where a claimant of government
land is deprived of his possibility of acquiring title. He
should be compensated according to the probability of his
acquiring title.35 In La Salle Coal Co. v. Sanitary District36
the court did not recognize any such right in the adverse
possessor. Action was brought for permanent injuries to
the freehold. At the time of the injury the plaintiff was in
possession under such claim of right that if continued for
the required length of time he would acquire title. After
tile statutory period had elapsed, action was Brought for
the injury. Relief was denied on the ground that at the
time of the injury the plaintiff was not the owner of the
property and, as such, was not entitled to recover for
permanent injuries to the freehold. Upon a proper show-
ing of the plaintiff that but for the interference of the
defendant title to the property as it was at the time of the
injury would have been acquired, he should have received
full compensation. Although there is no common law
action for an injury to such a right, still, being in a position
to maintain trespass, the court should award all damages
suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that trespass.
LD See EUis-worth, etc., Ry. Co. v. Gates, 41 Kan. 574, 21 Pac. 632 (1889). But
see Spokane, etc., Ry. Co. v. Zeigler, 167 V. S. 65 (1897).
sc 260 IlL. 423, 103 N. E. 175 (1913).
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The theory contended for here that an adverse possessor
is not the owner of property until he has acquired such
title by force of the statute of limitations would seem to be
contrary to the prevalent theory that the statute of limita-
tions does not operate to transfer title to the adverse pos-
sessor but merely quiets the title which he already has.8 7
The idea that the statute of limitations does operate as in
effect making a transfer of title was a theory entertained
by some very eminent authorities in the past.3 This inter-
pretation would seem to be more in accord with modern
decisions. A great deal of confusion results from attri-
buting to the adverse possessor an "inchoate title" or a
"growing title". However we consider the statute of limi-
tations as operating, the conclusion seems clear that mod-
ern decisions do not attribute to the adverse possessor the
rights of ownership.
37 H. W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 82 HAnV. L. Rev. at 141 (1918):
Henry Bordwell, Disseisin and Adverse Possession, 88 YALE L. J. 800 (1928).
's See Doe v. Sumner, 15 M. & W. 89 (1845) ; a paradox of Sugden's, 84
LAW QuAH. Rsv. 258 (1918).
9
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